CRS Issue Briefs by Morrison, Wayne M.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code IB91121
China-U.S. Trade Issues
Updated March 21, 2006
Wayne M. Morrison





U.S. Trade with China
Major U.S. Exports to China
Major U.S. Imports from China
Major U.S.-China Trade Issues
China’s Currency Policy
The Bush Administration’s Response
China Changes its Currency Policy
China and the World Trade Organization
WTO Implementation Issues
Most Recent Developments
Violations of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights
Most Recent Action
Chinese Acquisition of U.S. Companies
Congressional Concern Over the CNOOC Bid
Textile and Apparel Products 
U.S.-China Trade Legislation in the 109th Congress
Comprehensive China Trade Legislation
Bills Addressing China’s Currency Policy
Other Bills
IB91121 03-21-06
        Congressional Research Service    ˜    The Library of Congress
China-U.S. Trade Issues
SUMMARY
U.S.-China economic ties have expanded
substantially over the past several years. Total
U.S.-China trade, which totaled only $5 bil-
lion in 1980, rose to $285 billion in 2005.
China is now  the third largest U.S. trading
partner, its second-largest source of imports,
and its fourth largest export market.  With a
huge population and a rapidly expanding
economy, China is becoming a large market
for U.S. exporters. Yet, U.S.-China commer-
cial ties have been strained by a number of
issues, including a surging U.S. trade deficit
with China, which totaled $202 billion in
2005, China’s currency policy, and lax protec-
tion of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR).
 
The continued rise in the U.S.-China
trade imbalance, complaints from several
U.S. manufacturing firms over the competitive
challenges posed by cheap Chinese imports,
and concerns that U.S. manufacturing jobs are
being lost due to unfair Chinese trade prac-
tices have led several Members to call on the
Bush Administration to take a more aggres-
sive stance against certain Chinese trade
policies deemed to be unfair.  For example,
some Members argue that China’s currency
policy  undervalues its currency (the renminbi,
or yuan) vis-a-vis  the U.S. dollar, making
U.S. exports to China more expensive, and
U.S. imports from China cheaper, than they
would be if the yuan were fully convertible.  A
number of bills have been introduced to ad-
dress China’s currency policy, including some
that, and others that would apply U.S. counter-
vailing laws (dealing with government subsi-
dies) to nonmarket economies (based on the
belief that China’s currency policy is an indi-
rect government subsidy).  On July 21, 2005,
China announced it would appreciate its
currency to the dollar by 2.1% and begin to
peg the yuan to a basket of currencies.  How-
ever, many Members have expressed disap-
pointment that the yuan has not appreciated
significantly. On November 16, 2005, the
Senate agreed to consider S. 295, a bill which
would raise U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods by
27.5% unless China appreciated its currency
to market levels, no later than March 31,
2006. In the House, legislation (H.R. 3283)
was passed (July 27, 2005), which would
apply U.S. countervailing laws on government
to non-market economies, such as China.
(Some Members believe that China’s currency
policy constitutes a type of export subsidy.)
China joined the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) in 2001, and U.S. officials con-
tinue to closely monitor China’s compliance
with its WTO commitments.  A major concern
to U.S. policymakers regarding China’s WTO
commitments has been its failure to imple-
ment an effective strategy to combat wide-
spread IPR piracy in China.  Although China
has enacted a number of strict IPR laws and
regulations, U.S. firms charge that enforce-
ment is lax and ineffective and costs U.S.
firms billions of dollars in lost sales annually.
On October 26, 2005, the United States initi-
ated a special process under WTO rules to
obtain detailed information on China’s IPR
enforcement efforts.  If China fails to comply
with this request, the United States might
choose to bring a dispute resolution case
against it in the WTO.  The United States has
also threatened to bring a case against China
in the WTO over its discriminatory tax treat-
ment of imported auto parts.
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On February 14, 2006, the USTR issued a report describing the results of its top-to-
bottom examination of U.S. trade policy towards China and outlining steps that would be
taken to strengthen efforts to ensure China’s compliance with its trade commitments.   USTR
Rob Portman stated that “overall, our U.S.-China trade relationship today lacks equity,
durability, and balance in the opportunities it provides.”
On December 11, 2005, the USTR released its fourth annual report on China’s WTO
compliance.  The report stated that, while China had taken a number of important steps to
fulfil its commitments, serious problems remained, especially in regards to IPR enforcement.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Trade with China1
U.S.-China trade rose rapidly after the two nations established diplomatic relations
(January 1979), signed a bilateral trade agreement (July 1979), and provided mutual most-
favored-nation (MFN) treatment beginning in 1980.  Total trade (exports plus imports)
between the two nations rose from $5 billion in 1980 to $20 billion in 1990 to $285 billion
in 2005. China is now the third-largest U.S. trading partner.   Over the past few years, U.S.
trade with China has grown at a faster pace than that of any other major U.S. trading partner.
The U.S. trade deficit with China has grown significantly in recent years, due largely
to a surge in U.S. imports of Chinese goods relative to U.S. exports to China.  That deficit
rose from $30 billion in 1994  to $202 billion in 2005 (see Table 1).  The U.S. trade deficit
with China is now larger than that of any other U.S. trading partner, and in 2005 it was nearly
equal to the combined U.S. trade deficits with Japan, Canada, and Mexico ($209 billion).
The U.S. trade deficit with China in 2005 was about 24% higher than it was in 2004. 
Table 1.  U.S. Merchandise Trade with China:  1980-2005
($ in billions)
Year U.S.Exports U.S. Imports
U.S. Trade
Balance
1980 3.8 1.1 2.7
1985 3.9 3.9 0
1990 4.8 15.2 -10.4
1995 11.7 45.6 -33.8
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1996 12.0 51.5 -39.5
1997 12.8  62.6 -49.7
1998 14.3 71.2 -56.9
1999 13.1 81.8 -68.7
2000 16.3 100.1 -83.8
2001 19.2 102.3 -83.1
2002 22.1 125.2 -103.1
2003 28.4 152.4 -124.0
2004 34.7 196.7 -162.0
2005 41.8 243.5 -201.6
Source:  USITC DataWeb.
Major U.S. Exports to China
U.S. exports to China in 2005 were  $41.8 billion, up 20.5% over 2004 levels
(compared with the rise of total exports to the world at 10.8%) , making China the 4th largest
U.S. export market (it was 5th in 2004).   U.S. exports to China in 2005 accounted for 4.6%
of total U.S. exports (compared to 3.9% in 2003).  The top five U.S. exports to China in 2005
were aerospace products, semiconductors and electronic components, waste and scrap,
soybeans, and resins and plastic materials (see Table 2).  
Table 2.  Major U.S. Exports to China: 2001-2005
($ in billions and % change)
NAIC Commodity





Total all commodities 19.2 22.1 28.4 34.7 41.8 20.5 117.7
Aerospace products and
parts (mainly aircraft)
2.6 3.6 2.7 2.1 4.5 114.8 74.0
Semiconductors and other
electronic components
1.7 2.2 3.0 3.6 4.0 12.6 138.7
Waste and scrap 1.1 1.2 1.9 2.5 3.7 36.3 232.5
Oilseeds and grains
(mainly soybeans)
1.0 0.9 2.9 2.8 2.3 -17.3 125.5
Resin, synthetic rubber, &
artificial & synthetic
fibers & filament
0.8 0.9 1.2 1.6 2.1 30.4 175.8
Commodities sorted by top five exports in 2004 using NAIC classification, four-digit level.  
Source:  U.S. International Trade Commission Database.
Many trade analysts argue that China could prove to be a much more significant market
for U.S. exports in the future. China is one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, and
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rapid economic growth is likely to continue in the near future, provided that economic
reforms are continued.  China’s goal of modernizing its infrastructure and upgrading its
industries is predicted to generate substantial demand for foreign goods and services.
According to a U.S. Department of Commerce report: “China’s unmet infrastructural needs
are staggering.  Foreign capital, expertise, and equipment will have to be brought in if China
is to build all the ports, roads, bridges, airports, power plants, telecommunications networks
and rail lines that it needs.”  Finally, economic growth has substantially improved the
purchasing power of Chinese  citizens, especially those living in urban areas along the east
coast of China. China’s growing economy and large population make it a potentially
enormous market.  To illustrate:
! China  currently has the world’s largest mobile phone network, and one of
the fastest-growing markets, with 377 million cellular phone users as of
2005 (48 million new subscribers were projected to be added in 2006).  
! Boeing Corporation predicts that China will be the largest market for
commercial air travel outside the U.S. for the next 20 years; during this
period, China will buy 2,300 aircraft valued at $183 billion. By 2023,
Chinese carriers are expected to be flying more than 2,801 airplanes, making
China the largest commercial aviation market outside the United States. In
January 2005, Chinese airline companies ordered 60 new Boeing 787 jets for
$7.2 billion, and in August 2005, Chinese airline companies placed an order
for 42 Boeing 787 jets valued at $5 billion.
! In 2002, China replaced Japan as the world’s second-largest PC market.
China also became the world’s second-largest Internet user (after the United
States) with 111 million users at the end of 2005. 
! The Chinese government projects that by the year 2020, there will be 140
million cars in China (seven times the current level), and that the number of
cars sold annually will rise from 4.4 million units to 20.7 million units.
However, some U.S. trade analysts contend that China continues to pursue industrial
policies aimed at promoting the development of industries that have been deemed by the
government as critical for Chinese future economic development.   They claim such policies
seek to restrict imports of finished products, thus forcing foreign firms to invest in China to
gain access to the domestic market.  They note a significant level of U.S. exports to China
are raw materials, parts, and components used to produce finished goods for export. 
Major U.S. Imports from China
China is a relatively large source of many U.S. imports, especially labor-intensive
products.  In 2005, imports from China totaled $243 billion, accounting for 14.5% of total
U.S. imports in 2005 (up from 6.5% in 1996).  U.S. imports from China rose by 23.8% in
2005. The importance (ranking) of China as a source of U.S. imports has risen dramatically,
from 8th largest in 1990, to 4th in 2000, to 2nd in 2004 (and 2005). 
As indicated in Table 3, the top five U.S. imports from China in 2005 were computers
and parts, miscellaneous manufactured articles (such as toys, games, etc.), apparel, audio and
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video equipment, and communications equipment.  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, nearly
all of U.S. imports from China were low-value, labor-intensive products such as toys and
games, footwear, and textiles.  However, over the past few years, an increasing proportion
of U.S. imports from China has comprised of more technologically advanced products, such
as computers, which rose by 20.3% from 2004-2005.  
Table 3.  Top Five U.S. Imports from China: 2001-2005
($billions and % change)





Total All Commodities 102.3 125.2 152.4 196.7 243.5 23.8 138.0





16.5 19.5 21.8 23.7 26.4 11.5 60.0
Apparel 7.2 7.7 9.0 10.5 16.4 55.4 127.8
Audio and video
equipment
6.3 8.9 10.0 12.6 15.6 23.3 147.6
Communications
equipment
3.1 4.4 5.9 9.0 14.1 56.6 354.8
Commodities sorted by top five imports in 2005 using NAIC classification, four-digit level.
Source:  U.S. International Trade Commission Trade Data Web.
Many analysts contend that the sharp increase in U.S. imports from China is largely the
result of movement in production facilities from other Asian countries to China.2  That is,
various products that used to be made in Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, etc., and then exported
to the United States are now being made in China (in many cases, by foreign firms in China)
and exported to the United States.  An illustration of this shift can be seen in Table 4 on U.S.
imports of computer equipment and parts from 2000-2005.  In 2000, Japan was the largest
foreign supplier of U.S. computer equipment (with a 19.6% share of total shipments), while
China ranked 4th (at 12.1% share).  In just five years, Japan’s ranking fell to 4th, the value of
its shipments dropped by over half, and its share of shipments declined to 7.8% (2005);
Singapore and Taiwan also experienced significant declines in their computer equipment
shipments to the United States over this period.  In 2005, China was by far the largest foreign
supplier of computer equipment with a 45.4% share of total imports.  While U.S. imports of
computer equipment from China rose by 327.7% over the past six years, the total value of
U.S. imports from the world of these commodities rose by only 14.2%.  Many analysts
contend that a large share of the increase in Chinese computer production has come from
foreign computer companies who have manufacturing facilities to China. 
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Table 4.  Major Foreign Suppliers of U.S. Computer Equipment
Imports: 2000-2005
($billions and % change)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2000-2005% change
Total 68.5 59.0 62.3 64.0 73.9 78.2 14.2
China 8.3 8.2 12.0 18.7 29.5 35.5 327.7
Malaysia 4.9 5/0 7.1 8.0 8.7 9.9 102.0
Mexico 6.9 8.5 7.9 7.0 7.4 6.7 -2.9
Japan 13.4 9.5 8.1 6.3 6.3 6.1 -54.5
Singapore 8.7 7.1 7.1 6.9 6.6 5.9 -32.1
Taiwan 8.3 7.0 7.1 5.4 4.1 2.9 -65.1
Ranked according to top 6 suppliers in 2005. .
Source:  U.S. International Trade Commission Trade Data Web.
Major U.S.-China Trade Issues
Although China’s economic reforms and rapid economic growth have expanded U.S.-
China commercial relations in recent years, tensions have arisen over a wide variety of
issues, including the growth and size of the U.S. trade deficit with China (which many
Members contend is an indicator that the trade relationship is unfair), China’s currency
policy (which many Members blame for the size of the U.S. trade deficit with China and the
loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States), China’s mixed record on implementing its
obligations in the WTO, failure to provide adequate protection of U.S. intellectual property
rights (IPR), and over the challenges posed by China’s rising economic power  Several bills
have been introduced to respond to several of these issues (see section on legislation).
China’s Currency Policy3
Between 1994 and July 2005, China pegged its currency, the yuan, to the U.S. dollar at
about 8.28 yuan to the dollar.  In order to maintain the rate of exchange with the dollar, the
government has maintained restrictions and controls over capital transactions and through
large scale purchases of U.S. dollars.  For example, most firms in China are required to




Many U.S. policymakers and business representatives have charged that China’s
currency is significantly undervalued vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar (with estimates ranging from
15 to 40%), making Chinese exports to the United States cheaper, and U.S. exports to China
more expensive, than they would be if exchange rates were determined by market forces.
They complain that this policy has particularly hurt several U.S. manufacturing sectors (such
as textiles and apparel, furniture, plastics, machine tools, and tool and dye), which are forced
to compete against low-cost imports from China, and has contributed to the growing U.S.
trade deficit with China.  They have called on the Bush Administration to pressure China
either to appreciate its currency or to allow it to float freely in international markets. 
Chinese officials argue that its currency policy is not meant to favor exports over
imports, but instead to foster economic stability.  They have expressed concern that
abandoning its currency policy could cause an economic crisis in China and would especially
hurt its  export industries sectors at a time when painful economic reforms (such as closing
down inefficient state-owned enterprises and restructuring the banking system) are being
implemented.  Chinese officials view economic stability as critical to sustaining political
stability; they fear an appreciated currency could reduce jobs and lower wages in several
sectors and thus cause worker unrest.   
U.S. critics of China’s currency policy contend that the low value of the yuan has forced
other East Asian economies to keep the value of their currencies low vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar
in order to compete with Chinese products.  They further note that while China is still a
developing country, it has been able to accumulate massive foreign exchange reserves ($819
billion at end of 2005) and thus has the resources to maintain the stability of its currency if
it were fully convertible. They also argue that appreciating the yuan would greatly benefit
China by lowering the cost of imports.  Several bills have been introduced in Congress to
address this issue (see legislation section).   On the other hand, some analysts have indicated
concern that pushing China to appreciate its currency could cause it to decrease purchases
of U.S. Treasury securities, which might result in higher U.S. interest rates.  China is the
second largest foreign purchaser (after Japan) of U.S. Treasury securities ($257 billion at end
of 2005).  
 
The Bush Administration’s Response.  President Bush has criticized China’s
currency peg, stating that exchange rates should be determined by market forces, and he has
raised the issue during meetings with high level Chinese officials (including Chinese
President Hu Jintao.   Initially, the Bush Administration rejected calls from several Members
to apply direct pressure on China to force it to abandon its currency peg.  Instead, the
Administration sought to encourage China to reform its financial system under the auspices
of a joint technical cooperation program, agreed to on October 14, 2003.
The Administration’s position on China’s currency peg appears to have toughened  in
April 2005, when U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow stated at a G-7 meeting that “China
is ready now to adopt a more flexible exchange rate.”  In its May 17, 2005 report on
exchange rate policies, the Treasury Department stated that China’s currency peg policy “is
a substantial distortion to world markets” and that “China is now ready to move to a more
flexible exchange rate and should move now.”  The report warned that the Treasury
Department would closely monitor China’s progress over the next six months. 
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China Changes its Currency Policy.  On July 21, 2005, the Chinese government
announced that the yuan’s exchange rate would become “adjustable, based on market supply
and demand with reference to exchange rate movements of currencies in a basket,” (which
include the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, the euro, the South Korean won, and a number of
other currencies), and that the exchange rate of the yuan to the U.S. dollar would be
immediately adjusted from 8.28 to 8.11, an appreciation of about 2.1%.  Congressional
reaction to China’s announcement was mixed — many welcomed the move, but some
referred to it as merely a good first step and called on China to further appreciate the yuan.
However, on July 26, 2005, China’s Central Bank stated it had no immediate plans for
further revaluations and that reforms would be done in a “gradual” way. 
In its November 28, 2005 report to Congress on exchange rate policies, the Treasury
Department did not cite China as a country that manipulates its currency, but concluded that
it  had failed to fully implement its commitment to make its new exchange rate mechanism
more flexible and to increase the roll of  market forces.  Instead, the report stated that China’s
new currency appears to strongly resemble the previous mechanism of pegging the yuan to
the dollar.  However, the report stated that Treasury would not cite China as a manipulator
because of China’s assurances that it was committed to “enhanced, market-determined
currency flexibility” and  that it would put greater emphasis on promoting domestic sources
of growth, including financial reform.  Many Members of Congress have expressed
disappointment with China’s July 2005 reforms, as well as the conclusions of the November
2005 U.S. Treasury report.  Senator Schumer stated that he expected the Senate to take up
his bill on China’s currency no later than the end of March 2006 (see section on legislation).
 China and the World Trade Organization
Negotiations for China’s accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and its successor organization, the WTO, began in 1986 and took over 15 years to
complete. During the WTO negotiations, Chinese officials insisted that China was a
developing country and should be allowed to enter under fairly lenient terms.  The United
States insisted that China could enter the WTO only if it substantially liberalized its trade
regime.    In the end, a compromise  was reached that requires China to make immediate and
extensive reductions in various trade and investment barriers, while allowing it to maintain
some level of protection (or a transitionary period of protection) for certain sensitive sectors.
China’s WTO membership was formally approved at the  WTO Ministerial Conference in
Doha, Qatar on November 10, 2001 (Taiwan’s WTO membership was approved the next
day).  On November 11, 2001, China notified the WTO that it had formally ratified the WTO
agreements, and on December 11, 2001, it formally joined the WTO.  Under the WTO
accession agreement, China agreed to:
! Reduce the average tariff for industrial goods and agriculture products to
8.9% and 15%, respectively (with most cuts made by 2004 and all cuts
completed by 2010).
! Limit subsidies for agricultural production to 8.5% of the value of farm
output and eliminate export subsidies on agricultural exports.
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! Within three years of accession, grant full trade and distribution  rights to
foreign enterprises (with some exceptions, such as for certain agricultural
products, minerals, and fuels).
! Provide non-discriminatory treatment to all WTO members.  Foreign firms
in China will be treated no less favorably than Chinese firms for trade
purposes. 
! Implement the WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIP) Agreement upon accession.  
! Accept a 12-year safeguard mechanism, available to other WTO members
in cases where a surge in Chinese exports cause or threaten to cause market
disruption to domestic producers.  
! Fully open the banking system to foreign financial institutions  withing five
years.  Joint ventures in insurance and telecommunication will be permitted
(with various degrees of foreign ownership allowed).  
WTO Implementation Issues.  In December 2005, the USTR issued its fourth
annual China WTO compliance report.   The report stated that, while China had taken a
number of important steps to fulfil its commitments, several serious shortfalls remained,
especially in regards to IPR enforcement.  Many of these shortfalls have resulted from
China’s incomplete transition to a market based economy.  Many sectors of the economy are
still state controlled and receive subsidies and/or protection from competition. Major areas
of concern identified by the USTR’s report include discriminatory import policies,
burdensome regulations and restrictions on agriculture and services, industrial policies that
discriminate against foreign companies, restrictions on trading rights and distribution, failure
to provide adequate transparency of trade laws  and regulations, and poor IPR protection.
For example:  
! Industrial policies.  The USTR noted in its 2005 China WTO compliance
report that many of the shortcomings in China’s implementation of its WTO
obligations stemmed from its incomplete transition to a free market
economy.  A significant part of the economy, including the banking system
and state owned enterprises (SOEs) are controlled by the central government
— remnants of the old command economy that existed before reforms began
in 1979.   Although China agreed to make SOEs operate according to free
market principles when it joined the WTO, U.S. officials contend that SOEs
are still being subsidized, especially through the banking system.  This is
seen as a significant problem since a large share of China’s exports come
from SOEs, which may give Chinese firms an unfair trade advantage.  Under
the terms of China’s WTO accession agreement, China is required to report
its subsidy programs, but to date, has failed to do so. 
! Export subsidies and discriminatory taxes.   On March 18, 2004, the
USTR announced it had filed a WTO dispute resolution case against China
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over its discriminatory tax treatment of imported semiconductors.4
Following consultations with the Chinese government, the USTR announced
on July 8, 2004, that China agreed to end its preferential tax policy on
certain semiconductors by April 2005. However, the USTR has expressed
concern over new forms of financial assistance given by the government to
its domestic semiconductor industry.  In addition, in March 2006, the USTR
charged that China uses a discriminatory tax system on imported auto parts
in order to induce auto firms in China to use domestically produced parts,
and warned that it was considering taking this issue to the WTO 
! Services.   U.S. firms have complained that Chinese regulations on services
are confusing, burdensome, discriminatory, and lack transparency, especially
in regards to insurance, telecommunications, construction, and engineering.
! Health and safety requirements.  U.S. officials charge that China
continues to use a variety of health and safety regulations to effectively bar
foreign imports, especially food products (such as wheat, poultry and meats,
and citrus).  Many of these issues where supposed to have been resolved
under a 1999 agreement with China.
  IPR.  While China has enacted a variety of new IPR laws, enforcement of those laws
remains relatively weak and piracy levels high (see section on IPR below).  
Most Recent Developments.  A number of market access and IPR issues were
discussed during the latest round of meetings held under the auspices of the U.S.-China Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) held on July 11, 2005.5  In terms of market
access, China agreed to fulfil its WTO obligations on distribution rights and direct sales (and
to make rules governing these activities more transparent), continue a dialogue with the
United States to discuss U.S. concerns regarding access to insurance and telecom markets
in China, improve cooperation with the United States on animal and plant safety issues and
take other measures to improve access for U.S. agricultural products (including biotech
corn), and provide a detailed accounting of its subsidies to the WTO by the end of 2005.
China also agreed to substantial reforms to its IPR protection regime (discussed below).
Violations of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights
The United States has pressed China to improve its IPR protection regime since the late
1980s.  In 1991, the United States (under a Section 301 case) threatened to impose $1.5
billion in trade sanctions against China if it failed to strengthen its IPR laws.  Although
China later implemented a number of new IPR laws, it often failed to enforce them, which
led the United States to once again threaten China with trade sanctions.  The two sides
reached a trade agreement in 1995, which pledged China to take immediate steps to stem IPR
piracy by cracking down  on large-scale producers and distributors of pirated materials and
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prohibiting the export of pirated products, establishing mechanisms to ensure long-term
enforcement of IPR laws and providing greater market access to U.S. IPR-related products.
Under the terms of China’s WTO accession (see above), China agreed to immediately
bring its IPR laws in compliance with the WTO agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIP).  The USTR has stated on a number of occasions that
China has made great strides in improving its IPR protection regime, noting that it has passed
several new IPR-related laws, closed or fined several  assembly operations for illegal
production lines, seized millions of illegal audio-visual products, curtailed exports of pirated
products, expanded training of judges and law enforcement officials on IPR protection, and
expanded legitimate licensing of film and music production in China.   However, the USTR
has indicated that much work needs to be done to improve China’s IPR protection regime.
U.S. business groups continue to complain about significant IPR problems in China,
especially of illegal reproduction of software, retail piracy, and trademark counterfeiting.  It
is estimated that counterfeits constitute between 15 and 20% of all products made in China
and totals and accounts for about 8% of China’s GDP.  Chinese enforcement agencies and
judicial system often lack the resources (or the will) needed to vigorously enforce IPR laws;
convicted IPR offenders generally face minor penalties.  In addition, while market access for
IPR-related products has improved, high tariffs, quotas, and other barriers continue to
hamper U.S. exports; such trade barriers are believed to be partly responsible for illegal IPR-
related smuggling and counterfeiting in China.  Industry analysts estimate that IPR piracy in
China cost U.S. copyright firms $2.3 billion in lost sales in 2005.6 The piracy rate for IPR-
related products in China (such as motion pictures, software, and sound recordings) is
estimated at around 90%.7  In addition, China accounts for a significant share of imported
counterfeit products seized by U.S. Customs and Border Protection: $64 million, or 69% of
total goods seized, in FY2005.
IPR protection has become one of the most important bilateral trade issues between the
United States and China in recent years: 
! In April 2004, the Chinese government pledged to “significantly reduce”
IPR infringement levels by increasing efforts to halt production, imports,
and sales of counterfeit goods and lowering the threshold for criminal
prosecution of IPR violations. 
! On November 19, 2004, eight members of the House Ways and Means
Committee sent a letter to the Chinese Ambassador to the United States
(Yang Jiechi) expressing concern that proposed Chinese regulations on
government procurement of software  would virtually lock out U.S. software
companies due to requirements for local content and technology transfer.
! On December 16, 2004, General Motors Daewoo Auto & Technology
Company (a division of General Motors) filed a case in China against Chery
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Automobile Co. Ltd. (a Chinese firm) for allegedly violating its IPR by
copying one of its car models (the Chevrolet Spark) to produce the Chery
QQ.  The two companies reportedly settled the issue in November 2005. 8
However, case has raised concern in the United States because Chery is
planning to export its vehicles to the United States beginning in 2007.
! On February 9, 2005, the International Intellectual Property Alliance and the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce urged the USTR to initiate  WTO consultations
with China for its poor record on IPR enforcement.
! On April 29, 2005, the USTR announced that it had placed China on the
Special 301 “Priority Watch List,” due to “serious concerns”over China’s
compliance with its WTO IPR obligations and China’s failure to fully
implement its pledges on IPR made in April 2004 to make a significant
reduction in IPR piracy.  The USTR urged China to launch more criminal
piracy cases and to improve market access for IPR-related products, and
warned that it was considering taking a case to the WTO if IPR enforcement
did not soon show significant improvement. 
Most Recent Action.  During the JCCT July 2005 meeting, China agreed to boost
enforcement of IPR, such as increasing criminal prosecutions of IPR offenders, improving
cooperation among Chinese enforcement officials and between U.S. and Chinese IPR
officials, and taking special steps to halt movie and internet piracy.  It also pledged to
improve government coordination of  enforcement efforts, and to ensure the use by all levels
of the Chinese government (including state-owned firms) of legitimate software products.
In addition, the Chinese government agreed to delay implementing proposed regulations
restricting government purchases of foreign-made software and to accelerate efforts to join
the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement.  
On October 26, 2005, the United States initiated a special process under WTO rules to
obtain detailed information on China’s IPR enforcement efforts.  On December 22, 2005,
China responded by challenging the legal basis for such a request in the WTO.  U.S. officials
have stated, that failure by China to provide the requested information  could lead  the United
States to bring a trade dispute resolution case against China in the WTO over its lack if IPR
protection. IPR is expected to be a major topic at the next JCCT meeting scheduled for April
11, 2006.
Chinese Acquisition of U.S. Companies
China’s rise as an economic power has raised a number of concerns among U.S.
policymakers.  Of particular concern over the past year has been efforts by Chinese
companies with substantial state ownership to make bids to take over major U.S. companies.
Many Members believe these takeovers could pose risks to U.S. economic and national
security interests.  Some of these major takeover bids include:
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! On December 8, 2004, Lenovo Group Limited, a computer company
primarily owned by the Chinese government, signed an agreement with IBM
Corporations to purchase IBM’s personal computer division for $1.75
billion.  On April 30, 2005, the acquisition was completed.
! On June 20, 2005, Haier Group, a major Chinese home appliances
manufacturer, made a $1.28 billion bid to take over Maytag Corporation.
The bid was withdrawn on July 19, 2005.
! On June 23, 2005, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC),
through its Hong Kong subsidiary (CNOOC Ltd.), made a bid to buy a U.S.
energy company, UNOCAL, for $18.5 billion.  On August 2, 2005, CNOOC
withdrew its bid.
Congressional concern over Chinese efforts to purchase U.S. concerns is driven in part
by the perception that China does not play by the rules in international trade policy.    For
example, most of China’s major companies are state-owned or are largely owned by the
state.9  Many U.S. analysts believe that Chinese state firms are heavily subsidized by the
government (primarily through the banking system where loans often go unpaid) and that the
government has a plan to direct companies under its control to purchase major international
companies to obtain their brand names and thus become global companies. Some analysts
believe that the Chinese government may also be involved in financing takeover bids.
Finally, many Members contend that Chinese firms should not be allowed to take over U.S.
firms because, in most cases, China does not allow foreign firms to take over major Chinese
companies (rather it sometimes permits minority ownership in some companies). 
Congressional Concern Over the CNOOC Bid.  CNOOC’s bid to take over
Unocal was particularly troublesome to many Members of Congress. On June 27, 2005,
Representative Joe Barton, Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and
Representative Ralph Hall, chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on
Energy and Air Quality sent a letter to President Bush expressing “deep concern” over
CNOOC’s bid to take over Unocal, describing it “a clear threat to the energy and national
security of the United States.”  The letter went on to state that the transaction would put vital
oil assets in the Gulf of Mexico and Alaska into the hands of a Chinese state controlled
company, contrary to the goal of enhanced energy independence embodied in the House-
passed energy bill (H.R. 6).  Finally, the letter stated that the deal could transfer “a host of
highly advanced technologies” to China.  The letter concluded by urging the President to
ensure that “vital U.S. energy assets are never sold to the Chinese government.”  In the
Senate, letters written by Senators Conrad, Portman, and Grassley expressed concerns that
CNOOC’s bid to take over Unocal would be heavily subsidized by the Chinese government
and urged the Administration to determine whether the CNOOC bid would be a violation of
China’s WTO commitments.   Several bills were introduced on CNOOC’s bid, including
some that would have blocked the sale had it gone through.
CNOOC made a number of pledges to allay concerns, including promising that most
of the oil and gas produced by UNOCAL in the United States would still be sold in the
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United States and that most Unocal jobs in the United States would be retained.  The
chairman of CNOOC stated that his company’s main interest in UNOCAL was its large
holdings of oil and gas in Asia, not the United States.  However, on August 2, 2005, CNOOC
announced it was withdrawing its bid, citing significant political opposition to the sale in the
United States, which the company termed as “regrettable and unjustified.”10
Textile and Apparel Products 
Various U.S. industry groups have called on the Administration to invoke special
safeguard provisions (included in China’s WTO accession package) that would enable the
United States to restrict imports of certain Chinese products deemed harmful to U.S.
industries. U.S. producers of textile and apparel products have been particularly vocal over
the competitive pressures they face from China, especially since U.S. textile and apparel
quotas on Chinese goods were eliminated in January 2005.11  According to the U.S.
Commerce Department, China is the United States’ largest foreign supplier of textiles and
apparel, accounting for one-third of total imports in 2005 (or $16.8 billion).  U.S. textile and
apparel imports from China were 43.7% higher than they were in 2004 (compared with an
8.3% growth in total U.S. imports of these products from the world).  The sharp rise in textile
and apparel imports from China led the Administration to seek an agreement with China to
limit the level of its textile and apparel exports to the United States.  On November 8, 2005,
China agreed to restrict various textile and apparel exports to the United State (according to
specified quota levels) from January 2006 through the end of 2008.  
U.S.-China Trade Legislation in the 109th Congress
A number of bills that would affect U.S.-China trade relations have been introduced in
the 109th Congress.  This section lists major bills and congressional action.
Comprehensive China Trade Legislation
Legislation has been introduced that seeks to address a wide number of trade disputes
in U.S.-China relations:12   
! H.R. 3283 (English) would apply U.S. countervailing laws (dealing with
foreign government subsidies) to non-market economies; establish a
comprehensive monitoring system to track China’s compliance with specific
WTO commitments and pledges made at JCCT meetings (such as on market
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access, IPR protection, and reporting subsidies), and to require reports to
Congress on China’s progress on meeting these commitments; tighten rules
on anti-dumping duties to prevent non-payment; require the Treasury
Department to define “currency manipulation,”  describe actions that would
be considered to constitute manipulation, and report on China’s new
currency regime; increase funding for the USTR to improve monitoring and
enforcement of U.S. trade agreements; and require the U.S. International
Trade Commission to conduct a comprehensive study on U.S.-China trade
and economic relations.  The bill passed (255 to 168) on July 27, 2005.  A
similar bill has been introduced in the Senate, S.1421 (Collins).
! H.R. 3306 (Rangel) would apply U.S. countervailing laws to non-market
economies; require the USTR to bring a case against China in the WTO over
its currency practices; define currency manipulation in U.S. trade law as
“protracted large-scale intervention by an authority to undervalue its
currency in the exchange market;” narrow the discretion of the USTR and
the  President to deny relief for U.S. industries that are injured due to import
surges from China; tighten rules on anti-dumping duties to prevent non-
payment; and would reinstate “Super 301” to require the President to
identify trade expansion priorities and to take action against countries that
maintain the most significant barriers to U.S. exports.
! H.R. 4186 (Camp) would create a Chief Trade Prosecutor to ensure
compliance with trade agreements.  (The sponsors of the bill named China
and Japan as the prime targets of their bill).
!   S. 2317 (Baucus) would require the USTR to identify trade enforcement
priorities and to take action with respect to priority foreign country trade
practices, establishes within the USTR’s office a Chief Enforcement Officer
and a Trade Enforcement Working Group.
 Bills Addressing China’s Currency Policy  
In addition to H.R. 3283 and H.R. 3306, the following bills would address China’s
currency policy: 
! S. 14 (Stabenow), S. 295 (Schumer), and H.R. 1575 (Myrick) direct the
Secretary of the Treasury to negotiate with China to accept a market-based
system of currency valuation, and imposes an additional duty of 27.5% on
Chinese goods imported into the United States unless the President submits
a certification to Congress that China is no longer manipulating the rate of
exchange and is complying with accepted market-based trading policies.
H.R. 3004 (English) would require the Treasury Department to determine
if China manipulated its currency and to impose additional tariffs on
Chinese goods comparable to the rate of currency manipulation.
! S.Amdt. 309 (Schumer) to S. 600 (Foreign Affairs Authorization Act),
which would impose a 27.5% tariff on Chinese goods if China failed to
substantially appreciate its currency to market levels. On April 6, 2005, the
IB91121 03-21-06
13 A country would be considered to be manipulating its currency if there was a protracted
large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange markets.
CRS-15
Senate failed (by a vote of 33 to 67) to table the amendment,  In response to
the vote, the Senate leadership moved to allow a vote on S. 295 (which has
same language as S.Amdt. 309) no later than July 27, 2005, as long as the
sponsors of the amendment agree not to sponsor similar amendments for the
duration of the 109th Congress.  However, on June 30, Senator Schumer and
other sponsors of S. 295 agreed to delay consideration of the bill after they
received a briefing from Administration officials and were told that China
was expected to make significant progress on reforming its currency over the
next few months.  Disappointment over China’s July 2005 currency reforms
led Senator Schumer to push for consideration of S. 295 (under the previous
compromise).   On November 16, 2005, the Senate agreed to consider the
bill no later than March 31, 2006.
! H.R. 3157 (Dingell) and S. 377 (Lieberman) direct the President to negotiate
with those countries determined to be engaged most egregiously in currency
manipulation and  to seek an end to such manipulation.  If an agreement is
not reached, the President is directed to institute proceedings under the
relevant U.S. and international trade laws (such as the WTO)  and to seek
appropriate damages and remedies for the U.S. manufacturers and other
affected parties.
! H.R. 2208 (Manzullo), S. 984 (Snowe), and S. 1048 (Schumer) adds
changes to the criteria that the U.S. Treasury Department is required to
consider when making a determination on currency manipulation (including
a protracted large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange
markets) in its bi-annual reports on International Economic and Exchange
Rate Policies.13 
! H.R. 2414 (Rogers, Mike) would require the Treasury Department to make
a determination whether China’s currency policy interferes with effective
balance of payments adjustments or confers a competitive advantage in
international trade that would not exist if the currency value were set by
market forces.  If such a determination were made, the President would be
required to bring a WTO case against China to seek across-the-board tariffs
on Chinese goods in order to offset the subsidy effects of undervaluation. 
! H.R. 1216 (English) and S. 593 (Collins) would apply U.S. countervailing
laws to nonmarket economies. H.R. 1498 (Tim Ryan) would apply U.S.
countervailing laws to countries that manipulate their currencies.  
! S.Res. 270 (Bayh) expresses the sense of the Senate that the International
Monetary Fund should investigate whether China is manipulating its
currency.
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Other Bills
! H.Amdt 381 (Sanders) to H.R. 3057 would prohibit the U.S. Export-Import
Bank from financing the sale of U.S. nuclear power equipment to China.
The amendment passed on June 28, 2005, by a vote of 313 to 114.  A similar
measure in the Senate (S.Amdt.1242 to H.R. 3057) failed to pass, by a
margin of 37 to 62, on July 19, 2005.
! H.Con.Res. 203 (Rangel) expresses the sense of the Congress that the
United States should seek a commitment from China to join the WTO
Agreement on Government Procurement.
! H.Con.Res. 303 (DeFazio) urges the USTR to take action to ensure that the
China complies with its IPR obligations to protect IPR.
! H.R. 738 (Sanders) would terminate NTR status for China, while S. 2267
(Dorgan) would revoke China’s PNTR status.
! H.R. 4808 (Walter Jones) would  prohibit  imports of Chinese autos unless
China maintained  the same tariff rate on such vehicles as the United States.
! H.R. 4780 (Christopher Smith) would attempt to promote freedom of
expression on the Internet in certain countries (including China).  H.R. 4741
(Ros-Lehtinen) would promote the development and deployment of
technologies to prevent internet jamming by various countries (including
China).14  
